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Why does Syria (Surya) have an anomalous status—neither full Eretz Yisrael nor Chutz La'aretz? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: land *owned* by Am Yisrael but under individual sovereignty (kibbush yachid) lacks kedushah, while land with collective malchus Yisrael has full sanctity. This framework explains Syria's hybrid halachos and resolves contradictions in the Gemara (גמרא) and Rambam (רמב"ם).
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of the sugya in Gittin 8a dealing with the halachic status of Syria (Surya) and the fundamental distinction between kibbush yachid (conquest by an individual) and kibbush rabim (conquest by the collective). The Gemara (גמרא) states that Syria is chayav in maaser and shevi'is based on the principle "kibbush yachid shemei kibbush"—conquest by an individual is considered a valid conquest. Yet there are internal contradictions: if Syria has kedushah mid'oraisa, why is selling a slave to Syria grounds for emancipation? And why is it permissible to conduct business there on Shabbos (שבת) through amira l'akum (telling a gentile), which is only allowed for yishuv Eretz Yisrael? Rabbi Zweig begins by presenting Rashi (רש"י)'s position that kibbush rabim requires two conditions: (1) all of Israel fighting together (kol Yisrael b'yachad) and (2) conquest for the sake of all Israel (l'tzorekh kol Yisrael). According to Rashi, Dovid's conquest of Syria failed on both counts—not everyone participated, and Dovid conquered it for himself (l'tzorko). This creates an apparent difficulty: why are two conditions needed for kibbush rabim but only one missing condition creates kibbush yachid? By definition, if you lack the two requirements for kibbush rabim, it should automatically be kibbush yachid.
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Gittin 8a
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