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Why does asei docheh lo taaseh apply only when delaying means losing the mitzvah (מצוה) entirely? The shiur analyzes Tosafot and Rashba's dispute about whether zrizus (alacrity) creates a genuine conflict requiring violation of Shabbos (שבת), or whether only an objective requirement to perform the mitzvah today constitutes a true steira. The case of sereifas bas kohen reveals whether postponable mitzvos have different criteria.
This shiur analyzes the fundamental principle of asei docheh lo taaseh (a positive commandment overrides a negative prohibition) through a profound dispute between Tosafot and the Rashba. The Gemara (גמרא) in Yevamos 5b discusses when a mitzvah (מצוה) obligation can override Shabbos (שבת) prohibitions, using the cases of burning nosar (leftover sacrificial meat), sereifas bas kohen (executing a kohen's daughter through burning), and binyan Beis Hamikdash (building the Temple). Tosafot asks why we need a specific passuk to teach that burning nosar doesn't override Shabbos - couldn't we derive from klayim betzitzis (the prohibition of shatnez overriding the mitzvah of tzitzis) that when you can perform the mitzvah tomorrow, you don't violate a prohibition today? Tosafot answers that without the passuk, we might have thought asei docheh lo taaseh applies even when postponement is possible, because we're learning from a case where the mitzvah would be entirely lost if not done immediately.
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Yevamos 5b
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