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What makes a sukkah "gezulah" (stolen)? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: the psul of gezeilah applies only to the schach, not the karka beneath it. When karka ain nigzel (land cannot be stolen), one may fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה) even while trespassing, because the gezeilah concern is limited to the mitzvah object itself—the schach—not the ground it rests on.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of Sukkah 31a, examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of sukkah gezulah (stolen sukkah) and the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Chachamim. Rabbi Zweig opens by questioning why the Gemara obscures the basic case: the Mishna states "sukkah gezulah" without clarifying what this means, and only through a comparison to another case (ma'aseh b'Shus haRabim) does the Gemara reveal that it refers to someone who forcibly ejects another from their sukkah and sits there himself. The Kapos Temarim raises several fundamental questions: Why didn't the Mishna simply state the case clearly—"one who threw another out of his sukkah"? Why present two seemingly identical cases to teach the same principle? Additionally, the Kapos Temarim asks why the Gemara chose this particular scenario rather than other possible cases of theft: walking into someone's sukkah without permission (shelo al daas), building a sukkah in someone else's field, or simply refusing to leave when asked.
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Sukkah 31a
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
