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What makes a sukkah "gezulah" (stolen)? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: the psul of gezeilah applies only to the schach, not the karka beneath it. When karka ain nigzel (land cannot be stolen), one may fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה) even while trespassing, because the gezeilah concern is limited to the mitzvah object itself—the schach—not the ground it rests on.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of Sukkah 31a, examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of sukkah gezulah (stolen sukkah) and the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Chachamim. Rabbi Zweig opens by questioning why the Gemara obscures the basic case: the Mishna states "sukkah gezulah" without clarifying what this means, and only through a comparison to another case (ma'aseh b'Shus haRabim) does the Gemara reveal that it refers to someone who forcibly ejects another from their sukkah and sits there himself. The Kapos Temarim raises several fundamental questions: Why didn't the Mishna simply state the case clearly—"one who threw another out of his sukkah"? Why present two seemingly identical cases to teach the same principle? Additionally, the Kapos Temarim asks why the Gemara chose this particular scenario rather than other possible cases of theft: walking into someone's sukkah without permission (shelo al daas), building a sukkah in someone else's field, or simply refusing to leave when asked.
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Sukkah 31a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
