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What makes a partial vow expression (yad) valid? The Gemara (גמרא)'s position evolves dramatically—from accepting nearly any implied meaning (yad she'eino mochiyach klal) to requiring clear language of prohibition. The shiur traces how the expression "mudrani mimcha" shifts from being too vague to potentially binding, revealing whether yad operates through what the speaker meant or what he actually said.
This shiur analyzes Nedarim 4a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s evolving definition of yad (partial expression) in vows. The central question is what constitutes a valid yad—does it depend on what the person meant (machshava) or what they actually said (dibbur)? The Gemara begins with the case of someone who says "mudrani mimcha" (I am separated from you). Initially, this appears to be a yad she'eino mochiyach klal—an expression so unclear it has no legal force. The Ran explains that it could mean multiple things, and anything with two meanings effectively means nothing. However, the discussion reveals layers of complexity: does this create an issur dibbur (prohibition on speech/interaction) or issur achilah (prohibition on benefit)? The Gemara's conclusion that it requires additional language ("shani ochel," "shani to'el") suggests it may be a yad she'eino mochiyach rather than completely invalid.
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Nedarim 4a
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