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Why is kiddushin invalid when the man gives the money silently and the woman says "Hareini mekudeshes lach"? The Rashba's position is analyzed: Ki Yikach requires witnessing the husband's act of taking, not just mutual intent to marry. The shiur contrasts this with gittin and resolves apparent contradictions in the Rambam (רמב"ם).
This shiur analyzes a fundamental question in Hilchos Kiddushin: the case of "nasan hu v'amrah hi"—where the man gives money silently and the woman declares "Hareini mekudeshes lach" (I am betrothed to you). The Rashba holds this is invalid, and Rabbi Zweig explores the mechanics behind this ruling. The shiur begins with Rav Kivager's question on the Rashba. The Rashba initially states that nasan hu v'amrah hi is a chisaron (deficiency) of "ki yikach v'lo ki sikach"—the Torah (תורה) requires the man to "take" the woman in marriage, not the woman to "take" the man. But the Rashba also says there is a chisaron in the eidus (testimony). Rav Kivager asks: if the problem is who performs the ma'aseh kiddushin, why invoke a chisaron in eidus? And if the problem is deficient eidus, why mention ki yikach v'lo ki sikach?
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Kiddushin 5b
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