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Why does a gift given on condition of return (matana al menas lahachzir) count as a valid transfer? The Gemara (גמרא) proves from terumah that the recipient has true ownership, yet the shiur probes the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position that the kinyan may be chalipin rather than kesef. The Raavad's alternative—that the recipient must receive some value—raises new questions about what value exists when the object must immediately return.
The shiur opens with a detailed analysis of the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s ruling in Hilchos Zakiyah u'Matanah (24) regarding matana al menas lahachzir (a gift given on condition that the recipient return it). The Rambam states that such a gift is considered a valid gift and the recipient becomes the owner in all respects, except that he must ultimately return it. The Raavad raises a fundamental question from the Gemara (גמרא) on daf 48. That Gemara discusses a case where someone makes a vow prohibiting his father from benefiting from him, then attempts to give away food so his father can eat it at his son's wedding. The Gemara rules that this only works if the recipient has the power to be hefker (declare it ownerless). This implies that unless the recipient can be mafkir, the gift is not truly his, and the father would still be eating the son's food in violation of the vow. The question then is: by matana al menas lahachzir, since the recipient must return the object and cannot be mafkir it, how can it be considered a valid gift?
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Kiddushin 6b
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