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Why does a gift given on condition of return (matana al menas lahachzir) count as a valid transfer? The Gemara (גמרא) proves from terumah that the recipient has true ownership, yet the shiur probes the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position that the kinyan may be chalipin rather than kesef. The Raavad's alternative—that the recipient must receive some value—raises new questions about what value exists when the object must immediately return.
The shiur opens with a detailed analysis of the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s ruling in Hilchos Zakiyah u'Matanah (24) regarding matana al menas lahachzir (a gift given on condition that the recipient return it). The Rambam states that such a gift is considered a valid gift and the recipient becomes the owner in all respects, except that he must ultimately return it. The Raavad raises a fundamental question from the Gemara (גמרא) on daf 48. That Gemara discusses a case where someone makes a vow prohibiting his father from benefiting from him, then attempts to give away food so his father can eat it at his son's wedding. The Gemara rules that this only works if the recipient has the power to be hefker (declare it ownerless). This implies that unless the recipient can be mafkir, the gift is not truly his, and the father would still be eating the son's food in violation of the vow. The question then is: by matana al menas lahachzir, since the recipient must return the object and cannot be mafkir it, how can it be considered a valid gift?
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Kiddushin 6b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
