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Why does the Mishna distinguish between utensils for food preparation (napah v'kever) and other vessels (sak)? The shiur develops two distinct principles of hana'ah in nedarim: hana'ah from the object itself (requiring any benefit) versus hana'ah from the person (requiring food-related benefit). The Rambam (רמב"ם) and Shulchan Aruch disagree on when hana'ah is considered "from the person."
This shiur analyzes Nedarim 32b, focusing on the fundamental structure of prohibited benefit (hana'ah) in vows. Rabbi Zweig examines several difficulties in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s presentation of these laws and develops a novel framework to resolve them. The shiur begins with a structural question about the Rambam's organization. The Rambam discusses laws of lending objects in a place where rental is not customary (makom she'ein maskirin), then interrupts to discuss the opposite case (where rental is customary), before returning to discuss objects like sak lehavi peros (a sack to bring produce). This structure seems illogical—why interrupt the flow to discuss makom shemaskirin in the middle of discussing specific objects? Furthermore, how does Rav Papa's statement that "sak lehavi peros is forbidden" fit with the Mishna's framework, which seems to permit anything beyond food preparation vessels?
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Nedarim 32b
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