No community start suggestion yet.
Why does the Gemara (גמרא) say "lo teish meir vedol miria" (your seeing is no worse than testimony) when Beis Din sees the new moon themselves? Rashi (רש"י) holds Kiddush HaChodesh isn't a judicial process requiring witnesses—it's a sovereign act (kazeroy vekadesh), so when Beis Din sees directly, they function as the nation's representatives and declare "mekudesh mekudesh" themselves. A fascinating analysis contrasts Rashi and Tosafos (תוספות) and unpacks the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation.
This shiur offers a deep analysis of Rosh Hashanah 25b, focusing on the nature of Kiddush HaChodesh (sanctifying the new month) and whether Beis Din's role in this process is judicial or sovereign. The question arises from the Gemara (גמרא)'s statement that if Beis Din themselves saw the new moon, "lo teish meir vedol miria" (your seeing is no worse than testimony). What exactly does this principle mean, and what is the halachic mechanism at work? Rabbi Zweig explains that according to the Rambam (רמב"ם), Kiddush HaChodesh is not a judicial function of Beis Din but rather a sovereign responsibility. It is a din of Beis Din as malchus—an expression of Beis Din HaGadol functioning as the sovereign body of the Jewish nation. This is fundamentally different from a court case that requires witnesses and judicial procedures.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Rosh Hashanah 25b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
