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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) need a special din of arev to validate kiddushin when the woman says "give money to someone else"? The shiur distinguishes between mamoni gabach (which works for acquisitions but not kiddushin) and actual maaseh kiddushin. The Rambam (רמב"ם) holds you need real hana'ah as shevach v'kesef, while the Rashba attributes the actual nesinas mamon to the woman herself.
The shiur opens with the Pnei Yehoshua's fundamental question: if kiddushin through arev works, why do we need the special din of arev at all? The case of "tein maneh l'ploni v'kadash ani lach" (give money to someone else and I'll be betrothed to you) should work on the simple principle that it's hana'ah—she benefits from his willingness to spend money at her direction. Yet the Gemara (גמרא) derives a special din from arev (guarantorship). Why is this necessary? Rabbi Zweig identifies two fundamental approaches among the Rishonim regarding the basis of arev. The Ridvaz holds that arev works because you listened to me and spent money on my behalf—the very fact that you trust me enough to expend funds creates the obligation. The Rashba appears to hold that it's the recipient's receiving that matters—when the third party (C) receives the money, it's as if I (A) received it myself, since I directed it there.
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Kiddushin 7a
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