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Why can't we learn new punishments through logical derivation (ein onshin min hadin)? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: when Torah (תורה) explicitly charges us to use logic (gezeirah shavah), even fallible reasoning is valid. But when using binyan av to create an entirely new halachic entity that carries punishment, logic alone is insufficient—that limitation is what ein onshin min hadin restricts.
The shiur explores a fundamental question in the sugya of Nedarim 4b regarding the principle of ein onshin min hadin—that we don't impose punishments derived purely through logical inference. The Ran and Tosafos (תוספות) raise multiple challenges: Why didn't the Gemara (גמרא) ask earlier whether we can learn hafarat nedarim (nullification of vows) from a kal vachomer or binyan av from other sources? Why does the Gemara wait until discussing nazirus to invoke ein onshin min hadin? Rabbi Zweig begins by analyzing a Rambam (רמב"ם) in Hilchos Nedarim (Perek 12, Halacha (הלכה) 14) regarding who can perform hafarah. The Rambam states that a shoteh (mentally incompetent person) cannot be meifer because he lacks da'as (understanding), but a katan (minor) cannot be meifer only because ein lo ishus (he has no wife). This implies that if a katan could have a wife, he would be capable of hafarah, even though normally a katan lacks the legal capacity of a bar da'as. The shiur explains this through the concept of mufla samuch l'ish—a minor approaching adulthood who can make certain commitments. The Rambam must hold that hafarah is not merely a judgment about whether a vow should stand, but rather a ma'aseh haflah—an act of creation similar to making a neder itself. The husband creates something that negates her vow.
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Nedarim 4b
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