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What does it mean for a father to teach his son Torah (תורה)? The shiur analyzes Kiddushin 29b, distinguishing between transmitting information and teaching learning skills. The Gemara (גמרא)'s drasha "limadetem ulimadetem" creates a hekesh showing that just as one must learn "how to learn," a father must teach his son those same skills—not merely facts.
This shiur explores the Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 29b, which discusses the father's obligation to teach his son Torah (תורה). Rabbi Zweig develops a fundamental distinction between giving a child information versus teaching him skills—how to learn independently. The analysis centers on understanding what the mitzvah (מצוה) of chinuch (education) truly demands. The Gemara states that if a father does not teach his son, the son must teach himself. Rabbi Zweig asks: why is a pasuk needed for this? Every Jew is obligated in Talmud (תלמוד) Torah regardless. The answer reveals the deeper nature of the father's obligation. The Rambam (רמב"ם) in Hilchos Talmud Torah (1:1) uses revealing language: "chayav lelamed atzmo" (obligated to teach himself), not simply "chayav lilmod" (obligated to learn). This word choice is deliberate and significant.
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Kiddushin 29b
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