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When an animal takes food from one domain to eat it in another, when does the ma'aseh achila begin? The shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 20a, exploring Rashi (רש"י)'s and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s views on whether lekicha (taking) is part of the achila (eating), or whether they are separate acts. This dispute determines liability when an animal's mouth is in one reshus while food is in another.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Bava Kamma 20a, focusing on the fundamental question of when the ma'aseh achila (act of eating) begins—a critical issue in determining liability for damages caused by an animal's shen (eating). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where an animal stands in one reshus (domain) while food is in another reshus, and the animal moves the food toward itself to eat it. Rabbi Zweig begins by contrasting two major interpretations: Rashi (רש"י) understands the case as one where the animal is standing in either the reshus hanizik or reshus harabim, while the food is in the opposite domain, and the animal is magalgel (moves/rolls) the food toward itself. The safeik is whether we go basar shas lekicha (according to the moment of taking) or basar shas achila (according to the moment of eating). Tosfos, however, argues that the case involves the food itself moving (misgalgel) from one domain to another on its own, and the question is whether we judge based on where it will end up (mikar) or where it currently is (tavar mona).
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Bava Kamma 20a
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