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Why can a husband or father be mafir a wife or daughter's neder but not her nazirus? The Gemara (גמרא) states neder is "leis lekitzusa" (no fixed duration) while nazirus has a 30-day requirement. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position—unlike the Ran's focus on "tzaar"—is that hafarah uproots her ongoing commitment to abstain, not the chalos issur itself. By neder, the commitment determines duration; by nazirus, the Torah (תורה)-defined chalos does, creating the fundamental distinction.
This advanced Gemara (גמרא) shiur delves into Nedarim 4b, analyzing why hafarah (annulment) applies to nedarim but requires a special hekesh (textual analogy) to extend to nazirus. The Gemara's basic question is: If we learn from the parsha of nedarim that a father can be mafir his daughter's neder and a husband can be mafir his wife's neder, why do we need a separate hekesh to extend this to nazirus? The Gemara answers that neder is "leis lekitzusa" (has no inherent time limit) whereas nazirus is "eis lekitzusa" (has a fixed 30-day duration), and this distinction is critical. Rabbi Zweig presents an extensive analysis of the Ran's approach and its difficulties. The Ran suggests the difference is that neder creates more "tzaar" (distress/deprivation) for the woman because it is unlimited, whereas nazirus, being limited to 30 days, creates less tzaar. The fundamental question on the Ran is: a neder could be for just 10 days (e.g., "grapes are prohibited to me for 10 days"), which would seem to create even less deprivation than a 30-day nazirus. Yet the Torah (תורה) allows hafarah for all nedarim without distinguishing between temporary and permanent ones. How can the Ran's tzaar-based approach account for this?
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Nedarim 4b
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