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Why did Dovid HaMelech's conquest of Aram Naharayim and Syria not achieve full kedushah of Eretz Yisrael, even though it was done al pi Beis Din? The shiur develops a crucial yesod distinguishing two modes of Beis Din authority: as transmitters of Torah (תורה) Shebe'al Peh versus as representatives of the nation making pragmatic governmental decisions. A hora'as sha'ah ruling, even when necessary for the tzibbur, may still be considered shelo k'seder, explaining why this kibush lacked full sanctification.
This shiur continues the analysis of kibush yachid versus kibush rabim, focusing on the conquest of lands beyond the original boundaries of Eretz Yisrael during Dovid HaMelech's reign. The central question is how Dovid's conquest could be considered "shelo k'seder" (improper) when it was explicitly done "al pi Beis Din veNavi HaGadol" (with the sanction of the great court and prophet). Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Tosafos (תוספות), which indicates that kibush yachid (individual conquest) by Dovid HaMelech does not have the full din of kibush because it was shelo k'seder - Dovid conquered Syria and Aram Naharayim before completing the conquest of the land promised to Israel, specifically before conquering the Jebusite areas of Jerusalem. This appears to be a criticism suggesting Dovid did something wrong.
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Gittin 8a
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