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Why is a father obligated to educate his child in lo sa'aseh (negative commandments) when there's no benefit to the child—ein bezdin metzuvah lafrisha? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: chinuch on asehs (positive commandments) benefits the child directly, while chinuch on lo sa'aseh flows from the father's obligation of Talmud (תלמוד) Torah (תורה)—to teach his son Torah liman amanat la'asos (with intent to practice). This explains why mothers are exempt from chinuch on lo sa'aseh.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Tosfos on Yoma 82a regarding the nature of chinuch (educating children in mitzvos). The central question Rabbi Zweig addresses is Tosfos's apparent contradiction: Tosfos asks why there should be chinuch on lo sa'aseh (negative commandments) when ein bezdin metzuvah lafrisha (the court has no obligation to separate a minor from transgression), yet concludes that fathers are indeed obligated in such chinuch. The Gemara (גמרא)'s principle of ein bezdin metzuvah lafrisha means that when a child eats non-kosher food, for example, it is not considered "poison" in his system requiring removal. Since the child gains nothing from refraining from a lo sa'aseh, why should there be any educational obligation? This creates a fundamental problem: if there's no benefit to the child, what is the basis for chinuch on lo sa'aseh?
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Yoma 82a
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