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Why is a father obligated to educate his child in lo sa'aseh (negative commandments) when there's no benefit to the child—ein bezdin metzuvah lafrisha? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: chinuch on asehs (positive commandments) benefits the child directly, while chinuch on lo sa'aseh flows from the father's obligation of Talmud (תלמוד) Torah (תורה)—to teach his son Torah liman amanat la'asos (with intent to practice). This explains why mothers are exempt from chinuch on lo sa'aseh.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Tosfos on Yoma 82a regarding the nature of chinuch (educating children in mitzvos). The central question Rabbi Zweig addresses is Tosfos's apparent contradiction: Tosfos asks why there should be chinuch on lo sa'aseh (negative commandments) when ein bezdin metzuvah lafrisha (the court has no obligation to separate a minor from transgression), yet concludes that fathers are indeed obligated in such chinuch. The Gemara (גמרא)'s principle of ein bezdin metzuvah lafrisha means that when a child eats non-kosher food, for example, it is not considered "poison" in his system requiring removal. Since the child gains nothing from refraining from a lo sa'aseh, why should there be any educational obligation? This creates a fundamental problem: if there's no benefit to the child, what is the basis for chinuch on lo sa'aseh?
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Yoma 82a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
