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How can rov validate a get when the Gemara (גמרא) requires two witnesses? Rov doesn't resolve doubts—it establishes there is no doubt, so witnesses aren't needed. The shiur analyzes whether smoich miuta l'chazaka creates a definite issur or merely a safek, which determines whether an eid can tip the balance against the chazaka.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Gittin 2b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of when a get written lishmah can be validated through rov (majority presumption) versus requiring two witnesses. The central question is how rov can be sufficient when the Gemara establishes that two witnesses are needed—especially since an eid echad (single witness) is generally believed to negate a rov. Rabbi Zweig begins by establishing a fundamental yesod: rov does not resolve doubts the way witnesses do. Rather, rov tells us that there is no doubt in the first place. When the Torah (תורה) requires witnesses, it is because there is a genuine question that needs resolution. But when rov establishes the facts—such as that gittin are written lishmah—there is no question to resolve, and therefore no need for witnesses. This is analogous to the case where a man returns after two witnesses testified he died: we don't need witnesses to confirm his identity because we can see he is alive. The facts speak for themselves.
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Gittin 2b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
