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Why does the Mishna exclude chalipin from the methods of kiddushin, and why is this exclusion necessary if chalipin lacks a shaveh perutah? The shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s position that chalipin is fundamentally a kinyan rooted in agreement between parties, while kiddushin requires a kinyan that creates a Torah (תורה)-imposed reality. This distinction resolves the Rashbam's challenge and explains why marriage cannot be established through mere consensus.
This in-depth shiur on Kiddushin 3a examines the foundational dispute between Tosafos (תוספות) and Rashi (רש"י) regarding why chalipin (barter) cannot effect kiddushin (betrothal). The Gemara (גמרא) asks why the Mishna needs to explicitly exclude chalipin when it should already be excluded since it can work with less than a shaveh perutah (the minimum monetary value). Tosafos explains that wherever kesef (money) works, chalipin should also work because chalipin is included within the category of kesef. The kasha is that since the Mishna only lists methods explicitly mentioned in the pasuk, and chalipin should be included in kesef, why does the number "three" in the Mishna need to exclude it? The Gemara answers that chalipin is "ish d'poch mi'shav ruta" – since it can work with less than a shaveh perutah, it is not considered kesef but rather a "kinyan acher" (different type of acquisition). The Rashbam challenges this answer: if the teretz is simply that chalipin is not kesef, why does the Gemara add "isha lo mikneh nafsah" (a woman does not acquire herself)? The answer should be complete once we establish it's not kesef.
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Kiddushin 3a
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