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If a husband gives a conditional get saying 'if I don't return within twelve months, this is your divorce,' does unavoidable illness or other oines invalidate the condition? The shiur traces the sugya through Rashi (רש"י)'s framework that oines questions whether an act is truly 'his act,' but shows this creates new difficulties about the nature of conditional statements and personal intention in halacha (הלכה).
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kesubos 2a dealing with the principle of 'ein oines b'gittin' - that circumstances beyond one's control (oines) don't invalidate conditional divorces. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where a husband gives his wife a conditional get, stating 'if I don't return within twelve months, this should be your divorce.' The fundamental question is whether oines (unavoidable circumstances like illness) prevents the fulfillment of such conditions. The discussion begins with Rav Yosef's position regarding mezonos (support obligations). When the time comes for marriage and the groom cannot marry due to oines (sickness, his bride being a nida, etc.), the Chachamim don't obligate him to pay mezonos because the inability to marry was beyond his control. However, Rava challenges this by stating that in gittin (divorce), oines doesn't work the same way - even if a husband fails to return due to circumstances beyond his control, the conditional get remains valid.
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Kesubos 2a
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