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What distinguishes keren tam from keren muad when the damage is urchei (likely to occur)? The Gemara (גמרא) analyzes whether keren mechuber should be tam or muad. Tosafos (תוספות) holds keren is defined by meshuneh (unusual) behavior, while the Rambam (רמב"ם) defines it through kavana l'hazik. The resolution redefines the boundary between tam and muad and explains why we need separate pesukim for keren talush and keren mechuber.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Bava Kamma 2b, exploring the fundamental distinction between keren tam and keren muad through the case of keren mechuber (damage done with an attached object). The Gemara (גמרא) raises the question: "Eimei kulam muad" — why shouldn't all cases of keren mechuber be considered muad from the first occurrence, since they are urchei (within the normal course of behavior)? Tosafos (תוספות) raises a fundamental question: if keren mechuber is urchei, how can we learn it from the pasuk at all? Perhaps it should be regel entirely. Tosafos understands that the Gemara's havamina (initial assumption) was that keren mechuber should be regel because it is not meshuneh (unusual). The Gemara answers that even though keren mechuber is urchei, it is still b'chezkas shomer — meaning the animal is presumed not to do this behavior. This creates a category between totally unusual (keren talush, which is crazy behavior) and normal behavior (regel).
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Bava Kamma 2b
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