No community start suggestion yet.
Why does a clay flower pot not require a hole to obligate terumah and ma'aser, while a wooden pot does? The shiur analyzes the fundamental machloket between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות): whether atzitz nakuv works because the pot becomes an extension of the ground itself (Rashi's view of clay as earth), or because the hole enables nutrients to flow from the ground below (Tosafos's absorption theory).
This shiur explores Gittin 7b and the sugya of atzitz nakuv—a perforated flower pot—and the halachic principles that determine when produce grown in such a pot is obligated in terumah and ma'aser. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that a pot with a hole creates a connection to the ground, obligating the produce, while one without a hole does not. Rashi (רש"י) explains that a clay vessel (kli cheres) does not require a hole because clay itself is considered earth, making the pot's contents automatically connected to the ground. Tosafos (תוספות) challenges this, citing the Yerushalmi and Tosefta which indicate that clay prevents growth unless perforated, and argues that wooden pots absorb moisture better than clay. Rabbi Zweig develops a fundamental chakira to resolve the apparent contradiction. He proposes two possible yesodos for atzitz nakuv: (1) The hole makes the pot itself an extension of the ground—essentially creating one continuous stratum of earth; or (2) The hole enables the plant to draw nutrients directly from the ground below, even though it grows in the pot. This distinction determines whether we view the plant as growing "from the ground" or "in the pot that is connected to the ground."
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Gittin 7b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
