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What does it mean to be an onas (compelled person) when a get depends on fulfilling a condition? Rashi (רש"י) requires ta'ina onas (claiming compulsion), suggesting onas means acting unwillingly rather than lacking free choice. This reshapes how we understand compulsion in Jewish law.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental question in the laws of gittin (divorce documents): when a husband gives his wife a conditional get ("if I don't come by a certain date, this get is valid"), what happens if he fails to come due to circumstances beyond his control (onas)? The Gemara (גמרא) on Kesubos 2a discusses whether there is onas regarding gittin (ain onas b'gittin), and Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation raises profound questions about the nature of compulsion. Rashi states that one must make a "ta'ina onas" (claim of compulsion), which Rabbi Zweig identifies as highly significant. This requirement suggests that even when external circumstances prevent someone from acting, they must actively claim they were compelled for the onas to be legally recognized. The shiur explores what this means for defining onas itself.
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Kesubos 2a
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