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When a husband appoints an agent to deliver a get but then tries to cancel the agency, does that cancellation (bittul) work like normal agency revocation or is it fundamentally different? The shiur analyzes Gittin 79a, contrasting the machlokes between Reish Lakish and the Gemara (גמרא)'s position, exploring whether gittin shlichut involves creating a chalos (legal status) that cannot be reversed through standard bittul mechanisms—or whether the bittul simply means the get cannot act against the husband's will without destroying the agency itself.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Gittin 79a concerning the nature of bittul shlichut (cancellation of agency) in the context of divorce law. The central question is whether canceling an agent's appointment to deliver a get (bill of divorce) works like ordinary agency revocation or operates on a fundamentally different principle. Rabbi Zweig frames the discussion around the machlokes between Reish Lakish and the Gemara (גמרא)'s position. Reish Lakish held that shlichut in gittin works like shlichut in kiddushin (marriage)—as a standard agency relationship where the agent acts on behalf of the principal. According to this view, the husband's subsequent bittul (revocation) should work normally: the agent loses his authority, but the get itself remains valid for later use. The Gemara, however, rejects Reish Lakish's position with a tiyuvta (refutation), holding instead that gittin shlichut is fundamentally different from kiddushin. In gittin, the appointment creates a chalos—a legal status transfer—that requires witnesses (eidim) and functions more like testimony (davar shebe'ervah) than like standard agency. This means the get is not merely a task delegated to an agent, but a chalos that the agent brings into being.
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Gittin 79a
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