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Does a get (divorce document) require witnesses to sign lishmah (with specific intent), or only the writing itself? The Gemara (גמרא) asks whether Rav Elazar, who holds eidei mesira karsi (witnesses of delivery validate the get), still requires chasimah lishmah. The shiur analyzes the Ramban (רמב"ן)-Ridvaz dispute: whether witness signatures create the "shtar" status requiring lishmah, or merely testify to the divorce.
This shiur examines Gittin 3b, focusing on a fundamental question in the laws of divorce: when witnesses sign a get, must they do so lishmah (with specific intent for that particular divorce), or is it sufficient that only the writing itself be done lishmah? The Gemara (גמרא) presents a difficulty: according to Rav Elazar who holds eidei mesira karsi (that witnesses who observe the delivery validate the get), what is the requirement for witnesses who sign the document itself? The shiur analyzes the core sugya where the Gemara questions whether according to Rav Elazar you need ksiva (writing) lishmah or chasima (signing) lishmah. The basic tension is this: if Rav Elazar holds that witnesses of delivery are what validate the get, then when there are also witnesses who sign the document, what role do their signatures play? Must they sign lishmah?
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Gittin 3b
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