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Why doesn't kiddushin work when the man gives money and the woman says "Harei at mekudeshes li"? The shiur analyzes Tosfos's resolution: the kinyan itself becomes part of the kiddushin act through kiycha kiycha from Efron, not merely a prerequisite. This reframes the entire dynamic of who must actively perform the maaseh kiddushin and opens a fundamental question about the woman's role—purely passive object or potential active party.
This shiur on Kiddushin 5b addresses a fundamental question in the mechanics of kiddushin: what happens when the man gives money (nasan hu) but the woman makes the declaration of kiddushin (amar hi)? The Gemara (גמרא) seems to say this doesn't work, but the reasoning requires deep analysis. Rabbi Zweig begins by noting an apparent contradiction in Tosfos. One Tosfos states that you need both nasan hu (which we learn from "yotzei chinam ein kesef"—that the father must be eliminated from ownership) and amar hi (from ki yikach—that there must be a declaration). But a later Tosfos asks: if we already have the gezeiras shavah of kiycha kiycha from Sade Efron teaching us kinyan kesef, why do we need ki yikach at all? This suggests that nasan hu alone might be sufficient, creating an internal contradiction in Tosfos.
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Kiddushin 5b
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