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Why is pulling fruit from a tree forbidden on Yom Tov when it should qualify as ochel nefesh? The shiur analyzes a fundamental dispute among Rashi (רש"י), Tosafot, Ramban (רמב"ן), and Rambam (רמב"ם) over whether the prohibition stems from the melacha being doable before Yom Tov, whether it's only permitted from kneading onward, or whether non-food-preparation melachos constitute a separate forbidden category called melachot avodah.
This shiur on Beitzah 3a analyzes a foundational question in the halachos of Yom Tov: why is pulling fruit from a tree forbidden when it appears to be a melacha done for ochel nefesh (food preparation)? The Gemara (גמרא) states that fruit that fell from a tree on Yom Tov is forbidden as a gezeirah (rabbinic decree) lest one pull fruit down from the tree, implying that pulling fruit itself is prohibited. Yet the Torah (תורה) permits melachos on Yom Tov when done for food preparation—so why should this be forbidden? Tosafot offers one answer based on the Yerushalmi: only melachos from kneading (lisha) and onward in the bread-making process are permitted on Yom Tov. Melachos that precede kneading remain forbidden even when done for food. Rashi (רש"י), however, takes a different approach. Rashi explains that the prohibition applies to any melacha that could have been done before Yom Tov (efshar la'asot me'erev Yom Tov), even if it is for food. According to Rashi, hunting is forbidden because one could have trapped the animal before Yom Tov and kept it alive in water until needed. Tosafot challenges Rashi, arguing that we never find such a distinction—between what can and cannot be done before Yom Tov—applied to ochel nefesh itself; the Gemara only applies that distinction to machshirei ochel nefesh (food preparation prerequisites).
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Beitzah 3a
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