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When may a later beis din revoke an earlier gezeirah? The Gemara (גמרא) on Beitzah 5a-5b teaches that even when the original reason no longer applies, a minyan acher is needed to permit it. The shiur probes whether this means the later beis din is nullifying the decree or merely interpreting what the earlier sages intended, and develops that the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s requirement of "gadol b'chochma u'v'minyan" applies only when truly nullifying, not when showing the gezeirah never applied to these circumstances.
This shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא) in Beitzah 5a-5b, which establishes the principle of "davar shebeminyan tzorich minyan acher l'hatiro"—a decree enacted by a beis din requires another authoritative beis din to permit it. The central question is: what does it mean for the later beis din to "permit" (l'hatiro) the earlier decree? Are they nullifying what the earlier generation forbade, or are they interpreting and clarifying that the original decree was never meant to apply in the changed circumstances? The Gemara discusses the case of kerem revai (fourth-year fruit), which originally had to be brought up to Yerushalayim to beautify the city. After the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash, when Yerushalayim lay in ruins, Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai and his beis din permitted people not to bring the fruit to Yerushalayim. The question arises: since the original reason (to beautify Yerushalayim) no longer applied after the churban, why was a formal minyan acher needed to permit it? Shouldn't the takanah have automatically lapsed once its reason was nullified?
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Beitzah 5a-5b
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