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What creates the obligation to pay kofer when an ox kills a person? Rashi (רש"י) views kofer as criminal liability—the owner is considered to have killed indirectly, requiring near-certainty the animal would kill. The Rambam (רמב"ם) disagrees: kofer stems from a duty to guard any potential killer; once an animal loses its chezkas shlomim, the owner must ensure it won't kill, even if it's unlikely.
This shiur presents a fundamental machloket between Rashi (רש"י) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding the nature of kofer—the ransom payment required when an ox kills a person. Rabbi Zweig develops two opposing frameworks that explain the entire sugya of muad le-adam versus muad le-behema. According to Rashi, kofer is a criminal proceeding. When an animal is muad (established as dangerous through three prior gorings) and kills, it's as though the owner killed indirectly through his animal. This framework, Rabbi Zweig explains, parallels the Rambam's halachos in Hilchos Rotzeach, where someone who hires a killer or ties a person before a lion is chayav misah b'yedei Shamayim but not subject to beis din. For Rashi, kofer requires near-certainty the animal will kill—a likelihood high enough to attribute the death to the owner's negligence. This explains why Rashi holds muad le-adam is not muad le-behema: an animal established as dangerous to humans isn't necessarily likely to kill animals, and vice versa. The yesod is attribution of responsibility for the actual killing.
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Bava Kamma 2b
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
