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Why does a positive commandment (aseh) override a prohibition (lo taaseh)? The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s attempt to derive this principle from milah, Pesach (פסח), and korban tamid overriding Shabbos (שבת). Each suggested source faces a refutation (pircha), revealing fundamental questions: Is it because the aseh is "stronger," or is there an independent rule that a lo taaseh was given conditionally, subject to any prior aseh?
This shiur provides a detailed analysis of Yevamos 5b, which explores the fundamental principle of aseh docheh lo taaseh—that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. The Gemara (גמרא) attempts to derive this principle to show that yibum (levirate marriage) should override the prohibition of marrying one's brother's wife (achos ishto). The Gemara begins by trying to learn from milah (circumcision), which overrides Shabbos (שבת). The pircha (refutation) is "mah l'milah sheken nikras aleiha yibum ubrisis"—milah is unique because it carries the covenant (bris). Rabbi Zweig addresses two possible ways to understand this pircha: either it means milah is a "stronger" aseh than yibum, or it establishes an entirely different principle that only certain types of asayos override prohibitions. The problem with the first approach is conceptual: if we accept that an aseh can override a lo taaseh even when it's weaker than the prohibition, why should the relative strength between two asayos matter? Both are still weaker than the lo taaseh they override.
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Yevamos 5b
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