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When someone declares "I will not die without being a nazir," does nezirus take effect immediately? The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s ruling creates a paradox: one is both a nazir immediately yet subject to ba'al ta'acher. The shiur resolves this by distinguishing nezirus's positive dimension (actively fulfilling kedushas nazir) from its negative prohibitions (avoiding wine, haircuts), arguing that chalos nezirus occurs at the moment of the vow even though the obligation to affirmatively act as a nazir creates ongoing ba'al ta'acher liability.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental question in the laws of nezirus based on Nedarim 4a and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s codification in Hilchos Nezirus 1:4. The case involves someone who says "lo yafte min haolam ad sheyeiyeh nazir" — "I will not die without being a nazir." The Gemara (גמרא) states that such a person becomes a nazir immediately (miyad), yet the Rambam adds that if he fails to observe nezirus, he violates ba'al ta'acher (the prohibition against delaying fulfillment of a vow). This creates an apparent contradiction: if he is already a nazir immediately, how can there be ba'al ta'acher? Ba'al ta'acher applies to unfulfilled obligations, while once nezirus takes effect, failure to observe it would constitute ba'al yahel (violating an oath), not ba'al ta'acher. The traditional resolution offered by the Brisker Rav and Mishneh LaMelech understands "nazir miyad" to mean the person must accept (be mekabel) nezirus immediately, not that nezirus itself takes effect. Rabbi Zweig rejects this interpretation as strained and proposes a fundamentally different approach based on a careful reading of the Rambam's language and the Gemara's formulation.
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Nedarim 4a
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