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What makes a get valid when thrown near but not directly into a woman's hand? The shiur analyzes the dispute between the Ramban (רמב"ן), Rambam (רמב"ם), and Rama regarding karov lo (throwing close), da'at amos (four cubits), and whether these work through kinyan (acquisition) or yad (the concept of "hand"). The analysis shows how different Rishonim define when something is considered "in her hand" for gittin.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Gittin 78b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of how a get (bill of divorce) becomes valid when it is not placed directly into the woman's hand but thrown near her. The central question is whether karov lo (throwing the get close to the woman) creates a valid divorce, and if so, what is the mechanism that makes it work. The shiur begins by examining the Ramban (רמב"ן)'s position that karov lo works because of takanas chachamim (rabbinic enactment), and that one should not use this method lechatchila (ab initio) because emergency legislation should only be used when necessary. The question arises: if karov lo only works because of rabbinic enactment, what is the nature of this get? This leads to a fundamental inquiry into whether the mechanism is based on kinyan (acquisition) or yad (an extension of the woman's hand).
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Gittin 78b
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