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Why are we liable when our animal causes damage? The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: Is mamon hamazik liability because *I* am the mazik acting through my property (the Tur), or is it pure financial responsibility for what my property does (the Rambam (רמב"ם))? This machlokes reshapes the entire sugya of behema versus chaya, Shabbos (שבת) parallels, and eved liability.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of the Gemara (גמרא) in Bava Kamma 17b concerning the liability for damages caused by one's property, developing a fundamental chakira in understanding mamon hamazik. The discussion revolves around understanding the Gemara's question regarding the distinction between behema (domesticated animals) and chaya (wild animals), and why the Torah (תורה) needs to specify liability for both shen and regel. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the difficulty in the Gemara's havamina (initial assumption). The Gemara suggests one might have thought to exempt chaya (wild animals) from liability in reshus harabim, requiring the pasuk to teach us otherwise. But this is puzzling: if we are liable for damages caused by our property generally—including bor (pit) and eish (fire)—how could there be grounds to exempt liability for a wild animal? The kashe is compounded by Tosafos (תוספות)'s question: once we know from the Mishna regarding regel that be'ir (animals) includes both domesticated and wild animals, why does the Torah need to repeat this by shen?
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Bava Kamma 17b
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