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When a woman is forced into marriage, are we dealing with one halacha (הלכה) or two? The shiur distinguishes between ein isha miskadeshes ela lirtzona (she must want to be an eishes ish) and afkinu rabbanan kidushei minei (annulling forced kiddushin where she rejects the ma'aseh kiddushin itself). The Baal HaItur-Rashba dispute over tluvu konei is analyzed through the lens of whether financial obligations are separate hiskayavus or part of the kinyan.
Rabbi Zweig opens by reviewing the two separate halachos found in the Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding marriage by force. The first halacha (הלכה), derived from the Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin, establishes the principle of ein isha miskadeshes ela lirtzona—a woman cannot become married unless she wants to become an eishes ish. This is considered a pasuk according to Rashi (רש"י) and the Smag, and possibly a sevara according to the Rambam. The second halacha comes from the Gemara in Bava Basra and is codified in Hilchos Kiddushin: when a woman is forced into a ma'aseh kiddushin but actually wants to be married, the kiddushin is valid bedieved, but there is a din of afkinu rabbanan kidushei minei—the Rabbanan annul the kiddushin. The Rambam Maggid Mishneh explicitly states these are two separate sugyos. The Gemara itself in Kiddushin 2b uses different language: ein isha miskadeshes ela lirtzona is discussed in the sugya of Kiddushin, while mekadesh ish ba'al korcho is discussed in the sugya of Bava Basra (specifically dealing with shotgun weddings where the man is forced). The shiur emphasizes that these are fundamentally different issues—one concerns whether she wants to become an eishes ish at all, the other concerns her acceptance of the specific ma'aseh kiddushin.
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Kiddushin 2b
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