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Why is one liable for damage when leaving a tied ox with a deaf-mute child, but exempt when leaving fire? The Gemara (גמרא) distinguishes based on derech - children naturally tamper with tied animals but don't typically fan flames. Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot dispute whether the liability stems from inadequate initial guarding or from choosing an unreliable guardian.
This shiur analyzes Gemara (גמרא) Bava Kamma 21b, which discusses the principle 'kol shechaiv b'shmirasach shehaitiu nezikah' - anyone obligated in guarding who caused damage through inadequate watching is liable. The Mishna establishes that if one is partially responsible for damage, they are liable for the entire damage as if they caused it completely. The Gemara presents a case where someone gives a tied ox or covered pit to a deaf-mute child (cheresh she'eino pikeiach), and damage occurs. The question is whether the owner remains liable, unlike the case of fire where one would be exempt. The Gemara explains that with an ox and pit, their natural tendency (derech) is to eventually cause damage - ropes come undone and coverings fall away. Fire, however, naturally extinguishes over time.
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Bava Kamma 21b
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