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When gravel propelled by an animal causes damage, does it pay like keren (half damages from the body) or regel (full damages from assets)? The Gemara (גמרא)'s language of "muad" and "eino muad" reveals whether tzroros is fundamentally an unusual act (keren) or a normal derivative of walking (regel), determining both the payment source and the extent of liability.
Rabbi Zweig analyzes the fundamental dispute in Bava Kamma 18a regarding the classification of tzroros (damage caused by pebbles or gravel propelled by an animal's movement). The central question is whether such damage is paid migufah (from the body of the animal, like keren damages) or mealiyah (from the owner's general assets, like regel damages). The Gemara (גמרא)'s cryptic language of "muad and eino muad" appears to deliberately obscure the direct question, raising the issue of why the Gemara would use such ambiguous terminology. Rabbi Zweig demonstrates that Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) fundamentally disagree on the nature of the underlying dispute. According to Tosafos, the question is purely mechanical: does the halacha (הלכה) Moshe MiSinai establishing chatzi nezek (half damages) for tzroros also include a leniency that payment comes only from the body (migufah), parallel to the leniency of exemption in reshus harabim (public domain)? This reading treats tzroros as fundamentally regel-like, with the only question being whether the special halacha adds an additional leniency.
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Bava Kamma 18a
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