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Who is obligated to perform bris milah when the father doesn't? The Gemara (גמרא) establishes three layers: the father's mitzvah (מצוה), beis din's obligation, and the child's own duty. A key question emerges: is beis din's obligation a technical court function, or does it represent the broader responsibility of kol Yisrael—and if the latter, are women included?
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 29a's presentation of the various obligations in bris milah. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes three distinct chiyuvim: mitzvas ha'av (the father's obligation), the obligation of beis din when the father fails to act, and the child's own obligation once he becomes a gadol. The Rambam (רמב"ם) learns two separate mitzvos from two pesukim—mitzvas ha'av from Parshas Lech Lecha and mitzvas haben from Parshas Vayeira. Rabbi Zweig explores a fundamental question about the nature of beis din's obligation. The simple reading suggests it is a din on beis din as a halachic institution. The Shulchan Aruch HaRav states explicitly that beis din can appoint a mohel as their shaliach. However, the pasuk says "imo lachem kol zachar," suggesting the obligation may rest on kol Yisrael, with beis din merely serving as the executor of that communal responsibility—similar to kiddush hachodesh, where beis din acts as representatives of all Israel rather than bearing an independent institutional obligation.
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Kiddushin 29a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
