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Why is an ox that kills liable to pay kofer while a person who kills is exempt? The gemara (גמרא) suggests the ox has a chumra since it pays kofer — but that seems illogical; how can an ox's liability be greater than a person's liability for killing? The shiur develops that kofer liability is not about the aveira but about the action itself, and talmud (תלמוד) vi'cheski teaches that any strike (makah) that causes death exempts from kofer, even in cases of ones where there's no aveira at all.
This shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 4a, focusing on the gemara (גמרא)'s attempt to derive the laws of damage through a binyan av (inference) between shor (ox) and adam (person). The gemara asks: if only shor were written, could we learn adam? No, because shor has a chumra — it pays kofer (ransom) when it kills a person. Conversely, if only adam were written, could we learn shor? No, because adam has the chumra of paying arba devarim (four categories of damages). The shiur asks a fundamental question: this entire back-and-forth makes no logical sense. Why would we ever think to derive liability for one's property (animal) from liability for one's own actions? There is no inherent logical connection between being liable for what I do and being liable for what my animal does. The shiur then examines the specific chumra mentioned — that shor pays kofer. Rabbi Zweig asks: how can we call kofer a chumra that makes shor more chamur than adam? If a shor kills a person, it pays kofer. If an adam kills a person intentionally (meizid), he receives misa (death penalty). If he kills accidentally (shogeg), he goes to galus (exile) where the goel hadam can kill him. How is paying kofer a greater stringency than death or exile? The gemara's entire approach seems fundamentally flawed.
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Bava Kamma 4a
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