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Why does the mocher write the shtar by mekach u'memkar, while the chatan writes the shtar by kiddushin? The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s comparison between these two types of shtarot, exploring whether shtar works as a raya (proof) or as a demonstration of seriousness, and develops the Ran's insight that kiddushin is fundamentally different—the woman cannot transfer ownership she never had; rather, the husband creates new ownership.
This shiur provides an intensive analysis of Kiddushin 9a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s fundamental question: why does the shtar of mekach u'memkar (sales document) follow different rules than the shtar of kiddushin? The Gemara begins by stating that even if the shtar kiddushin lacks a shaveh prutah, if it contains the language "harei at mekudeshes li," "harei at me'ureses li," or "harei li l'ishah," it is valid—meaning the chatan writes it, not the kallah or her father. The Gemara challenges this by comparing shtar kiddushin to shtar mekach u'memkar, where the mocher (seller) writes the document. The shiur carefully examines Rashi (רש"י)'s approach to understanding this question: Rashi learns that the Gemara is asking how we know shtar kiddushin is a valid shtar at all, given that it doesn't follow the paradigm of shtar mekach u'memkar where the makneh writes it. The alternative reading of the question is simply: why do these two types of shtarot differ—why is one written by the makneh and the other by the koneh?
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Kiddushin 9a
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