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This shiur analyzes a complex Tosafot on Yevamos 4b addressing why soros sota doesn't need a special pasuk to be patur from yibum. The key chiddush: only an ervah—a prohibited relationship by its essence—patters a sarah; an issur eishes ach created by circumstances (like sota or shelo hayah b'olam) doesn't constitute ervah and therefore cannot patter. The shiur also explores a separate sugya on whether smuchin in Parshas Tzitzis teaches hilchos shatnez or hilchos tzitzis fabric.
The shiur opens with an analysis of a Gemara (גמרא) discussing tzitzis and shatnez. The Gemara in Yevamos 4b mentions that wool tzitzis may be placed on linen garments and vice versa, based on the principle of smuchin—the proximity of the parshah of tzitzis to the parshah of shatnez. Rabbi Zweig questions how this smuchin works: does it teach that shatnez is permitted for the mitzvah (מצוה) of tzitzis, or does it merely teach what fabrics are valid for tzitzis (wool and linen), independent of shatnez concerns? The difficulty is that if the smuchin only teaches one direction (e.g., wool on linen is permitted), how does the Gemara know the reverse (linen on wool) is also permitted? Rabbi Zweig suggests that perhaps the Gemara is not addressing shatnez at all. Instead, the smuchin teaches only about the valid fabrics for tzitzis—that tzitzis may be made from wool or linen, independent of the beged. This reading would avoid the problem of bidirectional smuchin. However, the Gemara's language—"wool for linen" and "linen for wool"—seems to imply a shatnez discussion, making this interpretation difficult.
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Yevamos 4b
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