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Why does the Mishna use the language "Isha niknes" (the woman is acquired) versus "Ish mekadesh" (the man sanctifies)? The shiur explores whether kiddushin is a kinyan (acquisition), a ritual, or both. The analysis follows the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion through Rashi (רש"י) and the Baal HaItur's approach, examining how the laws of get relate to kiddushin—particularly regarding nesiná and mechubar—and whether these apply only to shtar kiddushin or also to kesef.
The shiur opens with Rashi (רש"י)'s question on Kiddushin 2a: why does one Mishna say "Isha niknes" (the woman is acquired) while another says "Ish mekadesh" (the man sanctifies her)? Rashi suggests the language inconsistency is deliberate, reflecting a deeper conceptual issue about the nature of marriage—is it kinyan (acquisition) or kedusha (sanctification/ritual)? Rabbi Zweig develops two possible readings of the Gemara (גמרא). The first: kiddushin might be purely a ritual that results in kinyan—the woman becomes acquired, but the mechanism is a spiritual rite. The second: kiddushin might function as an actual kinyan kesef, working just like other kinyanim where money changes hands. The Gemara's answer—"mishum d'kaboilei misney kesef"—is explained by Rashi as teaching that kesef works here because we learn from "kich hakich" (the sale of Machpelah), where kesef accomplished a kinyan. But does this mean kesef itself operates identically in both contexts, or merely that both result in ownership?
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Kiddushin 2a
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