No community start suggestion yet.
How do we know tzitzis permits shatnez both ways—wool tzitzis on a linen garment and linen tzitzis on a wool garment? The shiur analyzes Rava's contradiction between "min kanaf" and "semer pishtim" and explores whether the Gemara (גמרא) derives this through semuchin (juxtaposition) between the shatnez prohibition and the tzitzis commandment or through a migu argument.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of a complex sugya in Yevamos 4b, focusing on Tosfot's interpretation of how we derive that shatnez (the prohibition of wearing wool and linen together) is overridden by the mitzvah (מצוה) of tzitzis. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a fundamental question: why do Tannaim and Rabbi Shimon need to learn this halacha (הלכה) from Bamidbar when they could seemingly derive it from the juxtaposition (semuchin) in Devarim between the prohibition of shatnez and the commandment of tzitzis? The shiur carefully works through Rava's contradiction: one verse suggests "hakanaf min hakanaf" (the tzitzis must be from the same material as the garment's corner), while another suggests "semer pishtim" (tzitzis are made from wool and linen). Rabbi Zweig explores two fundamentally different approaches to understanding this steira. The first approach holds that Rava is deriving from the juxtaposition in Devarim that tzitzis must be made specifically from wool or linen—a substantive halachic innovation derived from proximity. The second approach, which the shiur ultimately gravitates toward, understands that we already know "es adochelo sasah" (this overrides that) from the semuchin, and Rava's question is merely about the direction of that override.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Yevamos 4b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
