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When does a positive commandment override a prohibition? The shiur examines the Gemara (גמרא)'s principle of aseh docheh lo ta'aseh, distinguishing between prohibitions with kares (severe punishment) versus simple prohibitions. Rashi (רש"י)'s understanding is contrasted with Rav Chaim's framework, analyzing whether the principle applies differently to active mitzvos versus passive obligations, and exploring the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s distinction between Shabbos (שבת) and Yom Tov regarding shofar.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of the fundamental Talmudic principle of aseh docheh lo ta'aseh—when a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. The discussion centers on Yevamos 3b and the question of whether an aseh can override a lo ta'aseh she'yesh bo kares (a prohibition punishable by kares/excision). The shiur begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation of the Gemara (גמרא)'s question. According to Rashi, the fundamental question isn't simply about aseh docheh lo ta'aseh in general, but specifically about whether an aseh can override a lo ta'aseh she'yesh bo kares. Rashi understands that without a special teaching, we would assume that while an aseh might override a simple prohibition, it cannot override one carrying the severe punishment of kares. The Gemara's answer is that the general principle applies—aseh docheh lo ta'aseh—but then asks when this applies: does it work even for kares prohibitions?
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Yevamos 3b
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