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Does an arusa (betrothed woman) have a right to kesuvah payment? The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s ruling creates contradictions with his own statements about when kesuvah obligations take effect. The shiur resolves this by distinguishing between the Torah (תורה) obligation to marry (which begins at erusin) and the monetary obligations (which begin at nisuin).
This shiur analyzes a fundamental contradiction in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment of kesuvah obligations for an arusa (betrothed woman). The Mishna discusses the case of "Mishe'orastani nanas'ti" - a woman claiming she was raped after betrothal but before marriage. The Rambam rules she receives full kesuvah payment, but this creates four major difficulties: why doesn't he mention the husband's potential claim of "achshav haras tech" (you consented just now), why should she collect from mortgaged properties when an arusa normally only collects from free properties, why does she receive tosefes kesuvah when an arusa typically doesn't, and why introduce the possibility of consensual relations which would be "ein od daim parati" (undisputed obligation). Rabbi Zweig proposes that the Rambam holds kesuvah has two distinct components. First, there is a Torah (תורה) obligation (d'oraisa) for a husband to support his wife - this represents the fundamental marital relationship and applies even after his death, learned from the verse "k'mo yarap besulah." Second, there is a rabbinic enactment (d'rabbanan) requiring settlement payments upon divorce to prevent men from divorcing too easily ("shelo yihekel b'einav l'hotzi'ah").
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Kesubos 12b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
