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Does an arusa (betrothed woman) have a right to kesuvah payment? The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s ruling creates contradictions with his own statements about when kesuvah obligations take effect. The shiur resolves this by distinguishing between the Torah (תורה) obligation to marry (which begins at erusin) and the monetary obligations (which begin at nisuin).
This shiur analyzes a fundamental contradiction in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment of kesuvah obligations for an arusa (betrothed woman). The Mishna discusses the case of "Mishe'orastani nanas'ti" - a woman claiming she was raped after betrothal but before marriage. The Rambam rules she receives full kesuvah payment, but this creates four major difficulties: why doesn't he mention the husband's potential claim of "achshav haras tech" (you consented just now), why should she collect from mortgaged properties when an arusa normally only collects from free properties, why does she receive tosefes kesuvah when an arusa typically doesn't, and why introduce the possibility of consensual relations which would be "ein od daim parati" (undisputed obligation). Rabbi Zweig proposes that the Rambam holds kesuvah has two distinct components. First, there is a Torah (תורה) obligation (d'oraisa) for a husband to support his wife - this represents the fundamental marital relationship and applies even after his death, learned from the verse "k'mo yarap besulah." Second, there is a rabbinic enactment (d'rabbanan) requiring settlement payments upon divorce to prevent men from divorcing too easily ("shelo yihekel b'einav l'hotzi'ah").
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Kesubos 12b
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
