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Can the same instrument that creates kiddushin also dissolve it through divorce? The Gemara (גמרא) explores why money (kesef) cannot be used for divorce despite creating marriage, invoking the principle ein sanegor naaseh kateigor. The shiur examines whether kesef functions as a kinyan or as payment, and whether the verbal formula (amira) is intrinsic to the act or merely explanatory.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 5a, focusing on Rava's statement about why money cannot be used for divorce despite its efficacy in creating kiddushin. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes the principle of "ein sanegor naaseh kateigor" (an advocate cannot become a prosecutor) - that which creates a bond cannot also dissolve it. The central question is why this principle applies to money but not to documents (shtar), which can both create marriage and effect divorce. The shiur presents Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation that the fundamental difference lies in the role of verbal declaration (amira). By kiddushin performed with money, the words "harei at mekudeshes li" are not merely explanatory but constitute an integral part of the act of kiddushin itself. Since the verbal formulas differ between kiddushin and divorce, they are treated as two distinct acts (hai shtar lechud, hai shtar lechud). Similarly, with money, the different verbal declarations make them functionally separate acts, resolving the apparent contradiction.
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Kiddushin 5a
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