A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Does a shevuah require God's name, or just the word "shevuah"? The Gemara (גמרא)'s opening mishna on kinuyei shevuos (substitutes for oaths) reveals a fundamental debate between Rambam (רמב"ם) and Raavad on whether shevuos bitui (promissory oaths) are commitments or declaratory statements, and whether they differ from nedarim (vows).
This shiur analyzes the opening sugya of Maseches Nedarim (2a), focusing on the Mishna's statement that "kol kinuyei shevuos k'shevuos" — all substitute language for oaths has the force of oaths. The Ran raises a fundamental question: if every shevuah requires using God's name (shem), then the name alone should suffice, making the word "shevuah" or its substitute unnecessary. Why then does the Mishna need to validate kinuyei shevuos (substitutes for the word shevuah)? Rabbi Zweig develops the machlokes between the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Raavad through several key dimensions. The Rambam holds that every shevuah requires a shem (God's name), while the Ran and Rabbeinu Tam distinguish between different types of oaths. Rabbeinu Tam differentiates between shevuah mi'pi acheirim (an oath imposed by others) which requires a shem, and shevuah mi'pi atzmo (a self-imposed oath) which does not. The Raavad holds that malkus (lashes) requires a shem, but the basic issur (prohibition) exists even without one.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Nedarim 2a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
