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Why does Tosfos introduce the principle of hechsher mitzvah (מצוה) rather than using the Gemara (גמרא)'s simpler answer of lifnei hadibbur? The shiur analyzes Tosfos's multi-layered approach to distinguishing kibud av from other mitzvos, exploring the relationship between ase kodem hadibbur, lo sa'aseh she'yesh bo kares, and the unique strength of hukash kevodo l'kavod Hamakom.
This shiur on Yevamos 5b-6a engages in a close reading of Tosfos on the topic of ase doche lo sa'aseh, focusing particularly on the case of kibud av v'em and its interaction with Shabbos (שבת). The Gemara (גמרא) attempts to derive from the pasuk of kibud av v'em that an ase can be doche (override) a lo sa'aseh she'yesh bo kares, but ultimately rejects this derivation with various pirchot (objections). Tosfos raises a fundamental question: Why does the Gemara need to introduce the principle of hechsher mitzvah (מצוה) as a pircha? The Gemara could have simply used the established principle that kibud av is an ase she'kodem hadibbur (a positive commandment given before the giving of the Torah (תורה) at Sinai), and therefore cannot teach us about mitzvos given later. Tosfos explains that we cannot rely on this distinction because we want to learn from all three cases—Pesach (פסח), milah, and tamid—and those mitzvos were also kodem hadibbur. Therefore, we need another answer: that kibud av is only a hechsher mitzvah (preparation for a mitzvah) rather than the mitzvah itself, and from hechsher mitzvah we cannot learn about the gufa (essence) of a mitzvah.
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Yevamos 5b-6a
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