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Why does a shliach bringing a get from outside Eretz Yisrael need to declare "befanai nechtav u'nechtam"? The shiur analyzes a fundamental dispute between the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Raavad about whether shtaros (documents) are valid testimony mide'orayta or only miderabanan, and how this affects when befanai nechtav serves as valid kiyum (validation) of the get—whether only during the divorce process itself or even afterwards.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Gittin 2a, focusing on the requirement of "befanai nechtav u'nechtam" (declaring "it was written and signed before me") when a shliach delivers a get from chutz la'aretz (outside the Land of Israel). Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s explanation that this declaration is not required when the woman herself receives the get directly from her husband, since she is already divorced at that moment and there is no need for this statement. This raises the question: what exactly is the purpose of befanai nechtav u'nechtam? The Ran offers one explanation: when the husband appoints a shliach holachah (agent to deliver), there remains a possibility that the husband might later contest (me'areir) the validity of the get. However, when the woman receives the get directly or through a shliach kabbalah (agent to receive), the divorce is complete and there is no concern about later contestation. Rashi, however, appears to offer a different understanding—that once the woman is divorced, there is simply no procedural reason to make this declaration at all, regardless of concerns about contestation.
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Gittin 2a
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