No community start suggestion yet.
How does ma'amad shloshtan create a direct obligation from debtor to transferee when the debtor isn't party to the transaction? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: mechiras shtaros transfers only collection rights (shibud nechasim), leaving the debtor obligated to the original creditor, while ma'amad shloshtan creates a new shibud haguf directly obligating the debtor to the third party—explaining why mechilah works in one but not the other, and why all three parties must be present.
This shiur analyzes Gittin 13b-14a, focusing on the fundamental mechanics of ma'amad shloshtan (three-party transfer) and how it differs from mechiras shtaros (sale of a debt document). The central question is why ma'amad shloshtan requires all three parties to be present and why mechilah (forgiveness) operates differently in the two systems. The Rambam (רמב"ם) holds that mechiras shtaros is only derabbanan, and therefore mechilah helps—the original creditor can still forgive the debt. Tosafos (תוספות), however, says that by ma'amad shloshtan, mechilah does not help. This creates a fundamental problem: if both mechiras shtaros and ma'amad shloshtan are derabbanan, why should mechilah work in one but not the other? The Rambam himself seems to pasken in Hilchos Ishus that one can be mekadesh a woman with ma'amad shloshtan, but not with mechiras shtaros, suggesting that ma'amad shloshtan creates something fundamentally different.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Gittin 13b-14a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
