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When someone slaughters an animal, who is obligated in kisuy hadam—the shochet alone, or all of Klal Yisrael? The shiur analyzes a fundamental dispute between the Tur and Rambam (רמב"ם). The Tur holds kisuy hadam is a positive mitzvah (מצוה) incumbent on every Jew, with the shochet having precedence. The Rambam, however, argues it is solely the shochet's obligation; others are only responsible to ensure he fulfills it, stepping in only when he fails to act.
This shiur continues an analysis of the laws of kisuy hadam (covering the blood after ritual slaughter), focusing on a fundamental dispute about the nature of the mitzvah (מצוה) obligation and when bystanders are required to act. The discussion centers on Gemara (גמרא) in Chullin 26b and Rishonim on whether kisuy hadam is a mitzvah on every Jew or only on the shochet. Rabbi Zweig begins by reviewing the previous shiur's conclusion that the Rambam (רמב"ם) holds the mitzvah of kisuy hadam is not about honoring the mitzvah (kavod mitzvos), but rather about removing the blood—treating it as something to be eliminated from sight. This explains why one may not cover the blood with one's foot: not because the covering itself must be done respectfully (the mitzvah is to remove it), but because ultimately Hashem (ה׳) commanded it, and disrespect reflects on Him (she'eino kavod le'atzmo nishal mitzvos). The Rambam's formulation reveals that if the din were kavod mitzvos, covering with one's foot would not be problematic, since the mitzvah itself is to degrade the blood by removing it.
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Chullin 26b
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