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What are the obligations of a married woman toward her father? The Gemara (גמרא) teaches that while she is exempt when married due to being under her husband's authority, once divorced she becomes obligated again. The shiur analyzes whether this exemption is a true patur or merely oness (inability), examining the positions of the Ran, Ritva, and Radvaz and their implications for understanding the interplay between the obligations of kavod (honor) and yirah (reverence).
This shiur explores Kiddushin 29b, which discusses the obligations of a married woman toward her father in the mitzvos of kavod av v'eim (honoring one's parents) and morah av v'eim (reverence for one's parents). The central question is whether a married woman is truly exempt from these obligations or merely unable to fulfill them due to her obligations to her husband. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s position that one may not contradict one's father specifically in matters of Torah (תורה). He questions what difference it makes whether the disagreement concerns Torah or mundane matters, and whether this relates to embarrassing the father or to an objective standard of when one should contradict. The Rambam (רמב"ם) appears to rule that one may never contradict one's father in any matter, suggesting a broader application than Rashi indicates.
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Kiddushin 29b
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