A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
What are the obligations of a married woman toward her father? The Gemara (גמרא) teaches that while she is exempt when married due to being under her husband's authority, once divorced she becomes obligated again. The shiur analyzes whether this exemption is a true patur or merely oness (inability), examining the positions of the Ran, Ritva, and Radvaz and their implications for understanding the interplay between the obligations of kavod (honor) and yirah (reverence).
This shiur explores Kiddushin 29b, which discusses the obligations of a married woman toward her father in the mitzvos of kavod av v'eim (honoring one's parents) and morah av v'eim (reverence for one's parents). The central question is whether a married woman is truly exempt from these obligations or merely unable to fulfill them due to her obligations to her husband. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s position that one may not contradict one's father specifically in matters of Torah (תורה). He questions what difference it makes whether the disagreement concerns Torah or mundane matters, and whether this relates to embarrassing the father or to an objective standard of when one should contradict. The Rambam (רמב"ם) appears to rule that one may never contradict one's father in any matter, suggesting a broader application than Rashi indicates.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 29b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
