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Why is a thief liable for arba v'chamisha when his agent slaughters on Shabbos (שבת)? The shiur develops the yesod that liability requires not just shechita but shechita-as-theft (ma'aseh geneiva). On Shabbos, only shlichus can separate the chilul Shabbos (agent's act) from the geneiva (thief's intent), enabling liability where direct action would trigger kam lei b'rabba.
This shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 61a and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s rulings (Hilchos Geneivah 3:6, 2:10) regarding a thief's liability when he appoints an agent to slaughter stolen animals on Shabbos (שבת). The Gemara (גמרא)'s question—maskif lo Mar Zutra, "v'chi zeh chatah v'zeh miskayev"—opens a fundamental inquiry: if the thief himself would be exempt from payment due to kam lei b'rabba (executed for Shabbos violation, thus exempt from monetary penalty), how can he be liable when his agent performs the act? The shiur extracts from the Gemara a foundational principle: the thief is not liable merely for shechita (slaughter) but specifically for shechita-as-geneiva—slaughter that constitutes a continuation of the theft. The act must be a ma'aseh geneiva, not merely a technical ma'aseh shechita. This explains why Mar Zutra's question has force: when the thief would slaughter on Shabbos himself, kam lei b'rabba means he performs only chilul Shabbos, not geneiva. If he cannot perform ma'aseh geneiva himself, the principle of ein shlichus l'dvar aveira should bar him from appointing an agent to do what he cannot do.
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Bava Kamma 61a
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